In a sticky-price model with labor market search and matching frictions, forecast-based interest rate policy almost always induces indeterminacy when it is strictly inflation targeting and satisfies the Taylor principle. Indeterminacy is due to a vacancy channel of monetary policy that makes inflation expectations self-fulfilling. The effect of this channel strengthens as the sluggishness of the adjustment of employment relative to that of consumption increases. When this relative sluggishness is high, the Taylor principle fails to ensure determinacy, regardless of whether the policy is forecast-based or outcome-based, whether it is strictly or flexibly inflation targeting, or contains policy rate smoothing. JEL Classification: E24; E52 Keywords: Labor market search and matching frictions; Interest rate policy; Taylor principle Indeterminacy of equilibrium; Vacancy channel of monetary policy
Introduction
The recent literature has incorporated labor market search and matching frictions along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) into sticky-price models and has investigated their implications for inflation dynamics (e.g. Walsh This paper examines the implications for interest rate policy in terms of (local) equilibrium determinacy. Several specifications of the policy are studied: forecast-based or outcome-based, strictly or flexibly inflation targeting, or containing policy rate smoothing.
The main results of the paper are twofold. First, the forecast-based policy almost always induces indeterminacy when it is strictly inflation targeting and satisfies the Taylor principle. This result is in stark contrast to those of previous studies with a frictionless labor market (e.g. Bullard and Mitra, 2002; Woodford, 2003) . Second, when the sluggishness of the adjustment of employment relative to that of consumption is high within ranges of parameter values calibrated in the literature, the Taylor principle fails to ensure determinacy, regardless of whether interest rate policy is forecast-based or outcome-based or whether it is strictly or flexibly inflation targeting or contains policy rate smoothing.
Why does the active strictly inflation-forecast targeting policy make determinacy almost impossible? This is due to a vacancy channel of monetary policy that stems from the labor market search and matching frictions and that makes inflation expectations self-fulfilling. The labor market frictions result in firms' sluggish adjustment of employment. As a consequence, interest rate policy is transmitted by the vacancy channel in addition to the conventional aggregate demand channel that is the only channel in the absence of the labor market frictions. One point we emphasize here is that these two channels have opposing effects on inflation.
As usual, the aggregate demand channel leads a higher real interest rate to reduce inflation. By contrast, the vacancy channel causes a rise in the real interest rate to increase inflation. This is because 1 After the working-paper version of this paper (Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe, 2008) , there emerged two related papers, Tesfaselassie and Schaling (2009) and Rannenberg (2009) , both of which employ Blanchard and Galí (2010)'s sticky-price model with hiring costs. In this model, Tesfaselassie and Schaling find that the hiring costs limit the size of the policy response to unemployment that ensures determinacy. Rannenberg introduces skill decay during unemployment into the model and analyzes its implications for the Taylor principle.
a real interest rate rise, by dampening consumption demand, reduces firms' current vacancy posting and hence lowers the level of employment available for production in current and subsequent periods.
Hence, the interest rate rise lowers future output supply. At the same time, such a rate rise prompts households to substitute current with future consumption, and thus firms expect consumption demand to recover after its current decline. From this expected rise in future demand and the diminished future supply, firms anticipate a strong expansion of future vacancy posting. This raises expected future real marginal cost via an equilibrium job creation condition, and hence expected future inflation via the New Keynesian Phillips curve. Therefore, the vacancy channel leads a rise in the real interest rate to increase expected future inflation. This makes inflation expectations self-fulfilling under active policy responses solely to expected future inflation, thereby inducing indeterminacy.
The effect of the vacancy channel becomes stronger as the sluggishness of the adjustment of employment relative to that of consumption increases. In such a case, output supply adjusts more slowly to changes in consumption demand. Consequently, when that relative sluggishness is high, determinacy is ensured only by interest rate policy that fails to meet the Taylor principle. This is because when the real interest rate declines in response to a rise in inflation expectations, it yields a temporary increase in consumption demand. Hiring increases in response and the anticipation of a decline in future consumption in the face of elevated future employment lowers expected future real marginal cost. The resulting reduction in expected future inflation prevents the initial inflationary expectations from becoming self-fulfilling, and thus a determinate equilibrium is generated.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a sticky-price model with labor market search and matching frictions. In this model, Section 3 examines equilibrium determinacy under inflation-forecast targeting policy. Section 4 provides a sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
A sticky-price model with labor market search
The model is an optimizing sticky-price model with labor market search and matching frictions in line with the recent studies presented before (See the Appendix for details of the model). The loglinearized equilibrium conditions are displayed in Panel A of Table 1 . Eq. (T.1) is the Euler equation for optimal saving decisions, (T.2) describes the marginal utility of consumption, (T.3) is the resource constraint, (T.4) defines labor market tightness as the ratio of vacancies to job searchers, (T.5) is the law of motion of employment, (T.6) is the job creation condition that relates labor market tightness to real marginal cost, (T.7) is the New Keynesian Phillips curve, and (T.8) is interest rate policy.
The ensuing analysis uses a quarterly calibration of model parameters for the U.S. economy to illustrate conditions for determinacy. The baseline calibration is summarized in Panel B of Table 1 .
As in the monetary policy literature, the discount factor is set at β = 0.99, the risk aversion at σ = 1, the habit persistence at h = 0.8, the substitution elasticity at = 10, and the probability of no price reoptimization at α = 0.67. Regarding the labor market parameters, the worker bargaining power of 
Indeterminacy under inflation-forecast targeting policy
In the model presented above, this section examines implications of the labor market frictions for inflation-forecast targeting policy (i.e. i = 1 in (T.8)) in terms of equilibrium determinacy.
First, strictly inflation-forecast targeting policy (i.e. φ U = φ R = 0 in (T.8)) is considered in the absence of habit persistence in consumption preferences (i.e. h = 0), in order to facilitate comparison with previous studies that consider a frictionless labor market. In that case, the system of log-linearized equilibrium conditions (T.1)−(T.8) can be reduced to a system of the form
, where the coefficient matrix A is given in the Appendix. In this system, n t−1 is predetermined but π t and n t are not. Therefore, determinacy is generated if and only if the matrix A has exactly one eigenvalue inside the unit circle and the other two outside the unit circle. The following proposition is thus obtained using Proposition C.2 of Woodford (2003) . Case I: (1)−(4) hold. Or (1), (2) , and the strict inequality opposite to (3) hold.
where shows that for the job destruction rate greater than the threshold value of ρ = 0.08, the determinacy interval widens as ρ increases. However, when the job destruction rate is smaller than this threshold value, only the policy that fails to meet the Taylor principle makes determinacy possible. In that case, firms adjust employment very sluggishly to changes in consumption demand, and thus the effect of the vacancy channel is stronger than that of the aggregate demand channel for any policy response to expected future inflation. Therefore, if the real interest rate declines in response to a rise in inflation expectations, the resulting decrease in expected future consumption demand combined with a persistent increase in employment lowers expected future inflation. This prevents the initial inflationary expectations from becoming self-fulfilling.
The bottom two panels of Fig. 1 investigate whether a policy that is flexibly inflation-forecast targeting or contains policy rate smoothing is more likely to ensure determinacy. These policies are motivated by empirical studies such as Clarida et al. (1998 Clarida et al. ( , 2000 , who use them as a good description of actual monetary policy conducted in industrialized countries.
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With an active policy response to the inflation forecast, a sufficiently large policy response to the unemployment rate forecast or a sufficiently high degree of policy rate smoothing ensures determinacy. With typical values from estimated policy rules, e.g. φ U = 0.5 and φ R = 0.8 as in line with the estimates of Clarida et al. (2000) for the Volcker-Greenspan period, determinacy is guaranteed. This is because the feedback from the expected future unemployment rate or the past policy rate smoothens the change in the current policy rate in response to a shift in inflation expectations. This dampens the resulting change in the real interest rate and hence the change in consumption. Indeed, unemployment rises as a consequence of a rise in the real interest rate stemming from inflationary expectations and hence the negative policy response to the unemployment rate subdues such a rate rise. The results in the bottom panels of Fig. 1 provide an explanation for why the U.S. economy has not shown excessive volatility in recent decades in which Orphanides and Wieland (2008) indicate that U.S. monetary policy has been forecast-based.
From a normative perspective, the results provide an argument in favor of the policies in place of the strictly inflation-forecast targeting policy.
Sensitivity analysis
This section conducts a sensitivity analysis of equilibrium determinacy regarding values of model parameters and the specification of interest rate policy. The results are summarized in Table 2 .
Forecast-based policy
The first column with results shows how the interval of the inflation coefficient of strictly inflationforecast targeting policy that ensures determinacy changes with values of the model parameters. The strength of the recovery of expected future consumption in response to a rise in the real interest rate is determined by the degree of risk aversion σ as well as that of habit persistence h examined above.
A lower value of the risk aversion means a higher elasticity of substitution of current with future consumption and thereby makes indeterminacy more severe. On the other hand, the sluggishness of employment adjustment is determined directly by the steady-state unemployment rate U as well as the job destruction rate ρ analyzed above. θ t in the employment law of motion (T.5), it can be shown that a high value of U implies that changes in current employment persist strongly into the future. Consequently, for the value of U = 0.1, the Taylor principle fails to ensure determinacy, since the effect of the vacancy channel is stronger than that of the aggregate demand channel for any inflation coefficient φ π .
The job creation condition (T.6) relates labor market tightness to real marginal cost. Using (T.6) to substitute for the real marginal cost z t in the Phillips curve (T.7), the labor market tightness elasticity of inflation can be written as For instance, a smaller flow value of unemployment (b) yields a larger steady-state match value (γ/q) and hence increases the elasticity κ θ , and at the same time indeterminacy becomes more severe.
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Also, a lower value of worker bargaining power η, although it reduces the elasticity κ θ directly, increases the steady-state match value γ/q, which on balance raises the elasticity κ θ and makes indeterminacy more likely.
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A smaller value of the substitution elasticity increases the steady-state markup /( − 1), but reduces the steady-state match value γ/q by more, and thus the elasticity κ θ declines and indeterminacy is mitigated.
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Moreover, a smaller probability of no price reoptimization (α) increases the elasticity κ θ via the relation κ = (1 − α)(1 − αβ)/α and leads to more severe indeterminacy.
The search elasticity of matches, ξ, induces indeterminacy in two ways. First, like the lower job destruction rate ρ and the higher steady-state unemployment rate U illustrated above, a smaller value 5 Likewise, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) stress that the flow value of unemployment is an important determinant of the productivity elasticity of labor market tightness in the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) search and matching model. 6 The high values of b = 0.76 and η = 0.6 in Table 2 satisfy the condition that the job finding probability and the vacancy filling probability lie within the unit interval, but parameter values higher than these would violate that condition. 7 The steady-state match value γ/q is invariant to the flow cost of vacancy posting, γ, and hence indeterminacy is invariant to γ. 8 Calibrations with a low job destruction rate and a high unemployment rate may feature European labor markets well, suggesting that the Taylor principle is more likely to fail to guarantee determinacy in those economies. Likewise, as Shimer (2005) emphasizes, the search and matching model under his calibration is not able to generate large labor market flows as observed in the U.S. labor market.
Outcome-based policy
The last two columns of Table 2 present the results of determinacy under outcome-based policy (i.e. i = 0 in (T.8)). The interval of the inflation coefficient that ensures determinacy is always wide enough to include its realistic values as long as the Taylor principle is a necessary condition for determinacy. Intuitively, an active policy response to inflation increases the real interest rate, but such inflation is dampened by the decline of real marginal cost that results from the rise in the real interest rate. Consequently, the policy rate rise and hence the real interest rate rise are subdued, and thus determinacy is guaranteed.
In the absence of consumption habit persistence, determinacy is ensured as long as the Taylor principle is satisfied, i.e. 
Conclusion
Labor market search and matching frictions cause sluggish adjustment of employment and hence of output supply to changes in consumption demand. Consequently, a rise in the real interest rate increases expected future real marginal cost and hence expected future inflation. Therefore, indeterminacy is likely if interest rate policy is strictly inflation-forecast targeting and meets the Taylor principle. If the sluggishness of the adjustment of employment relative to that of consumption is high, a passive policy response to inflation ensures determinacy, regardless of whether the policy is forecast-based or outcome-based or whether it is strictly or flexibly inflation targeting or contains policy rate smoothing. A. System of log-linearized equilibrium conditions
B. Baseline calibration β subjective discount factor 0.99 σ relative risk aversion 1 h internal habit persistence in consumption preferences 0.8 elasticity of substitution between retail goods 10 α probability of no price reoptimization 0.67 η worker bargaining power 0. Notes: π t is inflation, R t is the nominal interest rate, z t is real marginal cost, n t is employment, v t is vacancies, θ t is labor market tightness, c t is consumption, and λ t is the marginal utility of consumption. κ = (1 − α)(1 − αβ)/α is the real marginal cost elasticity of inflation, p is the steady-state job finding rate, and q is the steady-state vacancy filling rate. The job destruction rate (ρ) and the steady-state unemployment rate (U ) determine p, which is 0.61 under the baseline calibration. The flow cost of vacancy posting (γ) is chosen to set q at a target value, which is 0.7 under the baseline calibration. 
A Appendix
This appendix presents details of our sticky-price model with labor market search and matching frictions. It also contains the proof of Proposition 1, which provides necessary and sufficient conditions for determinacy of equilibrium when interest rate policy is strictly inflation-forecast targeting in the absence of habit persistence in consumption preferences.
A.1 A sticky-price model with labor market search
The model is an optimizing sticky-price model with labor market search and matching frictions. This model is in line with recent business cycle studies, such as Walsh (2005) The economy is inhabited by four types of agents. First, the representative household consists of a continuum of members. Some members are employed and others search for jobs, but all members provide each other with insurance against unemployment risk by making joint consumption and saving decisions. Second, the representative wholesale firm hires workers in the matching market, and uses a linear technology to produce homogeneous goods. Third, retail firms transform wholesale goods into differentiated goods and set prices on a staggered basis as in Calvo (1983). Finally, the monetary authority sets its policy rate according to a Taylor (1993) style rule. A sunspot shock to inflation expectations is assumed to be the only source of aggregate uncertainty in the economy.
A.1.1 Labor market
The labor market is characterized by search and matching frictions along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) . Unemployed workers search for jobs, and firms pay a flow cost P t γ to maintain a job opening in period t. At the beginning of the period, a proportion ρ ∈ (0, 1) of existing matches n t−1 is exogenously destroyed before matching starts. Newly matched workers m t become productive instantaneously, and thus the law of motion of employment is
The matching friction faced by workers and firms is represented by a constant returns to scale matching function that determines the number of new matches between job searchers and vacancies as
where ψ > 0, ξ ∈ (0, 1), v t denotes the number of vacancies, and u t is the number of searching workers.
With the labor force normalized to one, the latter is given by
while the unemployment rate is defined as
The job finding probability p t and the vacancy filling probability q t are given by
where the ratio of vacancies to searchers
measures the labor market tightness. Thus, when the labor market is tight, a worker is more likely to find a job, and a firm is less likely to fill a vacancy.
A.1.2 Representative household
The representative household consists of a continuum of household members. To avoid distributional issues, it is assumed as in Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) that employed and unemployed household members pool consumption. Thus, the presence of a representative household can be considered.
This household purchases consumption goods c t , supplies one unit of labor inelastically, and holds nominal one-period bonds B t that earn the gross nominal interest rate R t in the subsequent period.
The household chooses consumption and bond holdings so as to maximize expected lifetime utility
subject to the budget constraint
Here, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, σ > 0 measures relative risk aversion, and h is the degree of (internal) habit persistence in consumption preferences. Family income consists of wage income P t w t n t from employment, unemployment income P t b (1 − n t ), and other income D t .
The disutility from employment is normalized to zero. Consumption c t = [
is a composite of differentiated goods produced by retail firms, with the substitution elasticity > 1.
Thus, cost-minimizing demand for good j is given by c t (j) = (P t (j)/P t ) − c t , where the aggregate price index satisfies
The optimality conditions for consumption and bond holdings are given by
where λ t is the marginal utility of consumption and π t = P t /P t−1 is the gross inflation rate. Taking account of the labor market flows gives rise to the following asset value of employment
The household's marginal value of a family member matched with a job equals the sum of the premium of the real wage over the unemployment benefit and the discounted expected future value. The latter is discounted by the time-varying discount factor that values future consumption in present terms and by the probability that the job is destroyed and no new job is found.
A.1.3 Representative wholesale firm
The representative wholesale firm uses a production technology that is linear in labor, y t = n t . This firm chooses employment n t and vacancies v t so as to maximize profits by selling its product at a relative price z t to retail firms in a perfectly competitive market. Thus, the firm solves the problem
subject to (A.1) and (A.6). The conditions for profit maximization include
where the Lagrange multiplier on the employment law of motion (A.1), J t , denotes the firm's asset value of a filled job, which consists of the current return plus the discounted expected future value.
Profit maximization requires this value to be equal to the average cost of filling a job opening. The average cost is the flow cost of posting a vacancy times the number of vacancies posted in order to fill one job, which is the inverse of the vacancy filling probability.
The costly job creation gives rise to a surplus from a match, S t = J t + W t , which is split between the matched worker and firm through Nash bargaining. The real wage is therefore set in order to provide the worker and the firm with a share of the match surplus W t = ηS t and
respectively, where η ∈ (0, 1) denotes the worker's relative bargaining power. The resulting real wage equation is
A job entails compensation for a fraction η of the revenue and the expected saving of hiring costs that the match generates, in addition to a fraction 1 − η of the forgone unemployment income.
A.1.4 Retail firms
There is a continuum of retail firms j ∈ [0, 1], each of which produces one unit of differentiated good j from one unit of wholesale goods and sells a quantity Y t (j) of good j to households in a monopolistically competitive market. Cost minimization implies that each retail firm's real marginal cost is equal to the wholesale goods' real price z t . Then, facing households' demand Y t (j) = c t (j) = (P t (j)/P t ) − c t , each retail firm chooses its profit-maximizing price subject to Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) style price stickiness. That is, each period a fraction α ∈ [0, 1) of retail firms does not reoptimize price and instead adjusts it for steady-state gross inflation π, while the remaining fraction 1 − α of firms faces the problem
The optimality condition for price setting is 
A.1.5 Monetary authority
The monetary authority conducts inflation targeting policy that adjusts the policy rate in response to either the present or expected future inflation and unemployment rates and contains policy rate smoothing
where R is the steady-state nominal interest rate, φ R ∈ [0, 1) is the degree of policy rate smoothing, and φ π , φ U are non-negative policy coefficients on inflation and unemployment rates. These policy specifications are referred to as, respectively, outcome-based if i = 0 and forecast-based if i = 1.
A.1.6 Log-linear approximation and calibration Table 1 in the paper. In this system the unemployment rate and the number of searching workers have been substituted by
Panel B of Table 1 
The steady-state vacancy filling rate q is obtained from the steady-state conditions of (A.12) and (A.14) as
A.2 Indeterminacy under inflation-forecast targeting policy
This section studies determinacy conditions when interest rate policy is strictly inflation-forecast 
